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ALIGNING OFF BALANCE SHEET RISK, ON BALANCE 
SHEET RISK AND AUDIT FEES:  
A PLS PATH MODELLING ANALYSIS 




This study focuses on using the partial least squares (PLS) path modelling methodology 
in archival auditing research by replicating the data and research questions from prior 
bank audit fee studies. PLS path modelling allows for inter-correlations among audit fee 
determinants by establishing latent constructs and multiple relationship paths in one 
simultaneous PLS path model. Endogeneity concerns about auditor choice can also be 
addressed with PLS path modelling. With a sample of US bank holding companies for 
the period 2003-2009, we examine the associations among on-balance sheet financial 
risks, off-balance sheet risks and audit fees, and also address the pervasive client size 
effect, and the effect of the self-selection of auditors. The results endorse the 
dominating effect of size on audit fees, both directly and indirectly via its impacts on 
other audit fee determinants. By simultaneously considering the self-selection of 
auditors, we still find audit fee premiums on Big N auditors, which is the second 
important factor on audit fee determination. On-balance-sheet financial risk measures in 
terms of capital adequacy, loan composition, earnings and asset quality performance 
have positive impacts on audit fees. After allowing for the positive influence of 
on-balance sheet financial risks and entity size on off-balance sheet risk, the off-balance 
sheet risk measure, SECRISK, is still positively associated with bank audit fees, both 
before and after the onset of the financial crisis. The consistent results from this study 
compared with prior literature provide supporting evidence and enhance confidence on 







This study focuses on using the partial least squares (PLS) path modelling technique in 
archival auditing research by replicating the data and research questions from prior bank 
audit fee studies (Fields et al. 2004; Cullen et al. 2012). In particular, with a sample of 
US bank holding companies for the period 2003-2009, we examine the associations 
among on-balance sheet financial risks, off-balance sheet risks and audit fees. We also 
address the pervasive client size effect, and the effect of the self-selection of auditors. 
The change of audit fee determinations over the onset of the GFC is also investigated.  
Prior literature extensively investigates the audit fee determinations (Hay et al. 2006 
and 2011). However, limited research has been done with regard to the role of 
off-balance sheet risks on audit fees. Off-balance sheet instruments have been widely 
used in the banking institutions since 1980s which have been identified as an effective 
tool to improve the entity’s liquidity and leverage initially before 2000 (Foley et al. 
1999; Schwarcz 2004) but increasingly deemed as risky financial instruments with 
significant technical complexity, management discretion and information ambiguity 
after Enron’s collapse in 2001 (Chen et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2012). From an auditor’s 
point of view, the risks embedded in the off-balance sheet exposures can be associated 
with audit risk in several ways: (1) The technical and reporting complexity in 
off-balance sheet instruments lead to increased level of relevant misstatement risk; (2) 
the management have incentives to employ off-balance sheet tools to window dress 
financial statements; in case the management discretion is abused, this management 
discretion leads to increased control risk and misstatement risk (Healy and Wahlen 
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1999; Degeorge et al. 1999; Matsumoto 2002); and (3) high business risk associated 
with the off-balance sheet activities is also considered by auditors. Cullen et al. (2012) 
provide empirical evidence that off-balance sheet asset securitization risks are positively 
related to bank audit fees. Comparative to Cullen et al. (2012), we use asset 
securitization risk as the proxy for off-balance sheet risk to test the impact of 
off-balance sheet risks on bank audit fees and its change after the onset of the global 
financial crisis (GFC).  
Auditors’ perceived audit risk associated with off-balance sheet risks is indirectly 
influenced by the entity’s on-balance sheet financial risk. On-balance sheet financial 
risks are a set of well-established audit fee determinants as summarized in Hay et al. 
(2006). Narrowing to the banking industry, Fields et al. (2004) establish a set of 
on-balance sheet financial risks representing the bank's capital adequacy, asset 
composition, asset quality and earnings performance, and market risk sensitivity. 
Subsequent bank audit fee studies find that the on-balance sheet financial risks are 
highly correlated and may lead to potential multicollinearity (Ettredge et al. 2011; 
Cullen et al. 2012), and additionally, there are high correlations among on-balance sheet 
financial risks and off-balance sheet financial risks (Cullen et al. 2012). In audit 
practice, auditors are required to evaluate audit risk based on the entity's overall 
business situation and financial status, including all aspects of risks from on-balance 
sheet items and off-balance sheet activities. Due to the fact that off-balance sheet 
activities are often used as a financial instrument to improve on-balance sheet leverage 
and liquidity, we argue that auditors should have considered on-balance sheet risks 
when evaluating audit risks associated with off-balance sheet items. Along with Cullen 
et al. (2012), we examine whether the on-balance sheet financial risk influence 
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off-balance sheet activities and further influence the association between audit fees and 
off-balance sheet securitization risks.  
We employ the partial least squares (PLS) path modelling methodology to 
simultaneously re-examine the direct and indirect relationships among off-balance sheet 
risks, on-balance sheet financial risks and audit fees. In addition to the main research 
questions on the association between off-balance sheet securitization risks and audit 
fees and its change over the onset of the GFC, the PLS path modelling methodology 
allows for further analysis on the impact of bank size on other audit fee determinants 
and the endogeneity of auditor choice in a simultaneous picture. Entity size is deemed 
as a dominating audit fee determinant (Simunic 1980; Hay et al. 2006) and has 
pervasive impact on different aspects of the bank's operation and financial decisions, 
including risk-taken activities (Demsetz and Strahan 1997), liquidity strategies (Fields 
et al. 2004), off-balance sheet transactions (Cullen et al. 2012) and auditor choice (Hay 
et al. 2006). Auditor choice is a debating issue with regard to its endogeneity nature and 
self-selection proposition (Chaney et al. 2004; Francis et al. 2012). Aligning with prior 
literature, we examine the direct and indirect effects of entity size on audit fees, and the 
endogeneity of Big N auditor choice and its impact on audit fees.  
The results confirm the dominating effect of size on audit fees, both directly and 
indirectly via its impacts on other audit fee determinants. By simultaneously 
considering the self-selection of auditors, we still find audit fee premiums on Big N 
auditors, which is the second important factor on audit fee determination. 
On-balance-sheet financial risk measures in terms of capital adequacy, loan 
composition, earnings and asset quality performance have positive impacts on audit 
6 
 
fees. After allowing for the positive influence of on-balance sheet financial risks and 
entity size on off-balance sheet risk, the off-balance sheet risk measure, SECRISK, is 
still positively associated with bank audit fees, both before and after the onset of the 
financial crisis.  
We hope this study could have introduced an easily applicable research method, the 
PLS path modelling, in archival accounting research that provides an additional 
analytical tool for accounting and auditing researchers. By combining principal 
component analysis (PCA) and linear regression technique on one path model, the PLS 
approach is able to test interrelated hypothesized relations among multiple latent 
constructs in one comprehensive picture. In this study, in addition to the main research 
questions on the associations among off-balance sheet risks, on-balance sheet financial 
risks and audit fees, we also investigate the inter-linked relationships among bank size, 
auditor choice, financial risks and audit fees simultaneously so that all the direct and 
indirect effects of certain factor can be explicitly quantified to form the total effect. The 
consistent results from this study compared with prior literature can add some 
confidence on the application of this new research technique in archival accounting 
studies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the suitability 
and advantages of PLS path modelling method in this audit fee study. Section III 
presents the literature review and empirical predictions. Section IV focuses on research 
method, and Section V presents the model validity and the test results. The study 




II. Why Do We Use the PLS Path Modelling Methodology 
The PLS methodology has the ability to overcome difficulties that have confounded 
methods previously used in audit fees studies. First, it is hard to disentangle the true 
effect of a particular type of audit risk on audit fees when there are serious high 
correlations among the audit fee determinants. Prior literature following Simunic (1980) 
demonstrates that audit fees are associated with measures of client size, client risk and 
client complexity and are also subject to certain auditors' characteristics. Among them, 
client size, client complexity, client risk and auditor choice are often highly correlated 
(Hay et al. 2006). Client size, not only directly affects audit fees, but also has an indirect 
effect on audit fees via its impact on other independent variables, e.g., client 
complexity. 1  Current research methodology with ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions cannot fully capture the total effect (direct plus indirect effects) of a 
particular determinant. This issue becomes particular critical in this study, in which 
bank financial risk measures are highly correlated with each other, and then further 
correlated with client size, auditor choice and off-balance sheet risk measures, leading 
to a potential multicollinearity problem. 
The second issue is the endogeneity existed in the self-selection of auditor choice and 
the self-selection of engaging in off-balance sheet activities. Endogeneity is a prevailing 
issue in auditing research as pointed out in Hay et al. (2006), which overlaps but is 
                                                 
1  Investigations uncover that the competing results of Big N firms’ impact on audit fees may be 
sensitive to the definition of ‘large’ and ‘small’ for client size (Simunic 1980 vs. Palmrose 1986). 
This issue is examined by Carson et al. (2004) with a sample of Australian fee data for 1995-1999. 
They report that Big N firms receive premiums in the small client segment but not in the large client 
segment. They also find that audit fees are not linearly related to client size as is typically assumed in 
audit fee models.  Their  results  suggest  that  failure  to  control  the non-linearity  
between  log  of  audit  fees  and  log  of  client  size  can  potentially  result  in 
misspecification of the model and misinterpretation of the results. 
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superior to the high correlations issue. An example is the effect of the existence of 
governance mechanisms on the demand for quality auditing, which increases audit fees 
due to a change in the assurance level provided by auditors (Eilifsen et al. 2001; Hay et 
al. 2006). Hay et al. (2006) identify that the differences in audit quality, the ability to 
provide non-audit services, and specialization can proxy for demand attributes that 
endogenously influence the empirical results of audit fee studies (Copley et al. 1994, 
1995; Chaney et al. 2004).   
High correlations among determinants and endogeneity are critical issues in bank audit 
fee determination. On a U.S. BHC sample of 2424 BHC-year observations for the 
period 2003-2009, Cullen et al. (2012) found that financial risk variables are highly 
inter-correlated and further correlated with client size, auditor choice and market risks; 
the interest variables, off-balance-sheet asset securitization risk variables, are also 
inter-correlated. Additionally endogeneity is suspected for the self-selection of Big N 
auditors as well as the self-selection of securitization activities.  
Two approaches have been used to deal with Endogeneity problems in prior research. 
First, Heckman’s two-stage approach has been widely used to correct for self-selection 
issues in OLS audit fee models (Chaney et al. 2004; Knechel and Willekens 2006). 
Second, two-stage least squares regression analysis (2SLS) is used because of the 
simultaneity/joint determinations of audit fees and some of the other variables, e.g., 
non-audit service fees (Whisenant et al. 2003; Antle et al. 2006; Hay et al 2006b). 
However, although endogeneity is assumed to be corrected either with Heckman 
two-stage approach or 2SLS simultaneously determination models, certain limitations 
restrict their validity and usefulness in audit fee research. Recent studies on 
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self-selection bias in accounting research demonstrate that Heckman two-stage 
approach might be misleading if there is no solid theoretical and model justification for 
excluding independent variables from the first stage regression and multicollinearity 
could be a critical issue in application of the Heckman approach (Tucker 2010; Francis 
et al. 2012). Moreover it is difficult to apply both Heckman and 2SLS approaches 
simultaneously to solve more than one joint determination issue and self-selection issue 
together due to the complexity of two approaches.  
We expect the methodology we used in this paper, the PLS path modelling, could shed 
some lights on the issues mentioned above. PLS is a component-based structural 
equation modelling technique that merges path analysis and factor analysis therefore 
allows researchers to simultaneously model the structural paths (the inner model 
relationships among latent variables) and measurement paths (the outer model 
relationships between latent variables and their manifest variables).  
Compared with first-generation techniques such as multiple regression analysis, 
principal component analysis, factor analysis and discriminant analysis, PLS 
accommodates a set of relationships among multiple independent variables and multiple 
dependent variables by establishing multiple relationship paths and constructing latent 
constructs in one comprehensive model (MacKinnon, 2008; Henseler et al. 2009), 
leading to the following strengths: 
 Simultaneous estimations in PLS rather than multi-step processing by 
regressions. For sequential hypotheses, researchers with traditional regression 
analysis employ multi-step process by firstly estimating the fixed values (or 
residuals) from the first order hypothesis tests and then inputting the fixed 
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values (or residuals) obtained into the hypothesis testing in the following order. 
Under PLS, sequential relationships can be constructed either by multiple-order 
paths in the structural model or by latent constructs in the measurement model2, 
and then the sequential relationships can be assessed simultaneously.  
 The simultaneous nature of PLS facilitates mediation analysis on the direct and 
indirect effects of the explanatory variables in the model. With regressions, each 
of the hypotheses within a mediated model must be tested using separate 
regressions where each potential mediator is examined in a multi-step process 
(e.g. Baron and Kenny, 1986). In PLS, mediating effects can be examined by 
establishing additional paths from the explanatory variables to the mediator and 
then from the mediator to the dependent variables. The direct effects from the 
explanatory variable to the dependent variable and the indirect effects via the 
mediator can be tested simultaneously in one-step under one PLS path model 
framework.  
 The latent constructs in the reflective measurement model3 allow for potential 
multicollinearity among manifest variables. By its nature, the reflective 
measurement model expects high correlations among manifest variables that 
capture the variances in the unobserved latent construct. Therefore, a 
combination of reflective measure models and the path modelling among latent 
                                                 
2  The PLS path model comprises two types of sub-models: the measurement model and the structural 
model. The measurement model depicts the relationships between each latent construct and its 
correspondent manifest variables. The structural model captures the relationships among the latent 
constructs (Kock 2012). 
3  A reflective measurement model refers to that within a measurement model, the relationship between 
the latent construct and the manifest variables is reflective, i.e., that the changes in the manifest 
variables reflect the change in the latent construct. (Coltman et al. 2008). In contrast, another type of 
measurement model is the formative measurement model, in which a number of manifest variables 
are combined to form a latent construct and the causality flows from the manifest variables to the 
latent construct.  
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constructs allows for the potential multicollinearity among highly correlated 
manifests that are not allowed for in the regression technique.   
Moreover, compared with covariance-based structural equation modelling (SEM) 
techniques, the PLS algorithm attempts to obtain the best parameter estimates for each 
constructs and manifests by maximizing of the explained variances of the dependent 
variables (Chin, 1998), which is similar to regression techniques. In contrast, 
covariance-based SEM techniques are based on the maximum likelihood approach by 
minimizing the difference between the sample covariance and that predicted by the 
theoretical model. Prior literature reports that PLS is less demanding on measurement 
scales, sample size and residual distributions (Wold 1985) and PLS also avoid 
inadmissible solutions (e.g. no solution for path parameters) and factor indeterminacy 
(e.g. no numerical scores obtained for latent variables), which are quite possible in 
covariance-based SEM techniques (Fornell and Bookstein 1982). Studies comparing 
PLS and covariance-based SEM techniques with Monte Carlo simulations find that (1) 
when a formative latent variable is introduced, the PLS method shows better robustness 
compared to covariance-based SEM (Vilares et al. 2009), and (2) on a normal data 
scenario, covariance-based SEM provides similar accuracy and robustness in parameter 
estimates as PLS. However, if the data assumptions on covariance-based SEM are 
violated, PLS offers more robust approximations (Ringle et al. 2007).  
The comparative strengths in PLS are particularly beneficial in this bank audit fee 
research. First, audit fee studies usually involve interrelated research questions. For 
example, audit fees are a function of client size, complexity and risks, and other auditor 
attributes. Meanwhile, client size not only dominates the audit fee determination but 
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also affect other client attributes in complexity and risks. In addition, the self-selection 
of auditor argument implies that auditor attributes are also influenced by client 
attributes. In another words, the audit fee determination framework involves multiple 
relation paths in multiple directions. A certain variable that is the dependent variable in 
one modelling block can be the explanatory variable in another modelling block. 
Traditional OLS audit fee models cannot capture these complex interrelated 
relationships in a single stage whereas PLS provides a tool to cope with it in a path 
modelling framework, and both the direct effect and the indirect effect of interested 
variables in the framework can be obtained with PLS. 
Second, multicollinearity, a prevailing problem in audit fee research, can be addressed 
using PLS in two alternative ways. PLS supports latent variables, which are linear 
composites of the associated manifest variables within one construct. Therefore, 
multicollinearity among manifests within one construct can be allowed in PLS. 
Alternatively, multicollinearity among constructs can be captured and controlled by 
establishing paths between constructs.  
Third, self-selection and joint determination issues can be addressed in PLS. 
Self-selection of a high quality audit can be settled with a construct for auditor choice. 
Paths are established from the constructs of client attributes to the construct of auditor 
choice, to control for self-selection effect of auditor choice. Joint determination of audit 
fees and non-audit service fees can be controlled by a construct for service fees, which 
consists of audit fees and non-audit fees as manifest variables.  
Finally, compared with covariance-based SEM techniques, PLS have fewer restrictions 




III. Empirical Predictions 
This study focuses on the PLS methodology and the predictions developed in this study 
are consistent with prior audit fee literature, especially replicated from Cullen et al. 
(2012) for the purpose of comparability.  
3.1 Off-Balance Sheet Securitization Risk and Audit Fees 
The purpose of an audit is to reduce information risk by providing assurance that an 
entity’s financial report is free from material omissions or misstatements. Auditing 
standards require auditors to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level when planning and 
conducting an audit. An auditor who identifies higher risk of material misstatement is 
expected to reduce detection risk by allocating more audit resources (expending more 
effort) to the higher risk areas of the engagement to achieve an acceptable level of audit 
risk (O’Keefe et al. 1994; Pratt and Stice 1994; Lyon and Maher 2005; Hay et al. 2006).  
We expect off-balance sheet financial risks to increase auditors’ assessment of the risk 
of material misstatement. First, off-balance sheet transactions usually involve complex 
transaction procedures between multiple parties, which involve complex legal 
documents and increase inherent risk. Second, off-balance sheet transactions are often 
used from earnings management (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Degeorge et al. 1999; 
Matsumoto 2002) and capital management (Moyer 1990; Karaoglu 2005) motives. 
These factors increase the risks of a material misstatement in the financial statements of 
banks engaged in off-balance sheet transactions. Therefore, we argue that off-balance 
sheet risks will increase auditors’ assessment of the risks of material misstatement and 
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that auditors will adjust their audit effort accordingly, thus increasing audit fees.  
H1: There is a positive association between off-balance sheet financial risks and audit 
fees. 
In this study, off-balance sheet financial risk is proxied by asset securitization risks, 
consistent with Cullen et al. (2012). Furthermore, as asset securitizations have been 
identified as significant off-balance sheet contributors to the financial crisis, following 
Cullen et al. (2012), we investigate if there is a change in the positive association 
between off-balance sheet securitization risks and audit fees with the onset of the GFC 
(H2). 
3.2 The impact of On-Balance Sheet Financial Risk 
On-balance sheet financial risks are associated with regulatory risk, business risk as 
well as inherent risk in bank audits. The banking industry is a highly regulated industry 
and banks are more responsible to supervisory agencies. Fields et al. (2004) argue that 
measures important to supervisory agencies are primarily important for auditors to 
attend in audit engagements. Bank regulators in U.S. and in other countries adopt 
CAMELS rating system with a focus on risks at capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management efficiency, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market risks.  
CAMELS risks align with business risks of the banks and are considered as inherent 
risks by auditors. Inherent risks are positively priced in audit engagements as they may 
lead to higher risk of misstatements in associated parts in the audit and also may require 
specialized audit procedures (Simunic 1980; Hay et al. 2006). It is usually cited that 
inventory and receivables are the areas with high inherent risks in non-bank audits 
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(Newton and Ashton 1989; Hay et al. 2006). Current asset and systematic risk are also 
been used as proxies for inherent risk in prior research and are found positively 
significant (Hay et al. 2006). In bank audits, banks with unfavourable capital ratios, 
asset quality and liquidity status are vulnerable to unfavourable business environmental 
changes, leading to going concern considerations from auditors. Management 
deficiency can attract fraud and errors in management and operations, leading to higher 
audit risk. Furthermore, earnings ratios are one of the important signals in going 
concern consideration; unfavourable earnings performance are also regarded as an 
incentive to manipulated reporting.  
Prior bank audit fee studies fully support the overall importance of financial risks in 
audit fee determination (Fields et al. 2004; Boo and Sharma 2008; Ettredge et al. 2011). 
However, the effect of particular financial risk on audit pricing is still inclusive. For 
example, the commercial loan ratio and mortgage loan ratio are positively significant in 
Fields et al. (2004); in Cullen et al (2012), the commercial loan ratio is insignificant and 
the mortgage loan ratio shows a negative sign. Despite of the period difference between 
the two studies, the correlation analysis indicates these two loan composition ratios are 
seriously correlated with other financial risk measures, and also highly driven by bank 
size and associated with Big N auditor choice. 
Literature suggests associations between on-balance-sheet financial risks on off-balance 
sheet activities. In particular for asset securitizations, by their nature, securitization 
activities are closely correlated with the originating bank’s loan stock, therefore relating 
to the loan composition measures. In addition, securitization transactions may arise 
from motives for on-balance sheet financial distress or pressure (Healy and Wahlen 
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1999; Degeorge et al. 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Moyer 1990; Karaoglu 2005); and bank 
management may exploit the information veil to use securitizations for manipulation 
purposes (Karaoglu 2005; Ambrose et al. 2005; Rosenblatt et al. 2005; Dechow and 
Shakespeare 2009). Cullen et al. (2012) indicate significant associations between 
on-balance sheet asset quality and earnings measures and off-balance sheet 
securitization risks.  
In summary, we expect significant influences of on-balance-sheet financial risks on 
off-balance sheet risks. Moreover, we also expect positive impacts of on-balance sheet 
financial risks on bank audit fees.  
3.3 Additional Predictions 
We consider the effects of BHC size and auditor choice in audit fee determinations, 
particularly their impact on on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet risks and their 
overall effects in the audit fee model.  
 Size Effect 
Size is widely accepted as the dominant audit fee determinant which has an 
overwhelmingly positive relationship with audit fees (Simunic 1980; Hay et al. 2006). 
Typical size measures include the transformed total assets and sales revenues. In a 
comprehensive meta-analysis study, Hay et al. (2006) confirm that the size effect is so 
strong that there would have to be more than 100,000 unpublished studies with an 
opposite result to deny this size effect.  
Bank audit literature demonstrates the same effect of bank size. Cullen et al. (2012) 
indicate that the client size by itself (as proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets) 
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explains over 70% variances in audit fees. In addition, bank size is highly correlated 
with a series of bank financial risk measures, asset securitization risk measures and 
auditor attributes, suggesting the effect of bank size could be either direct or via its 
indirect effects on other audit fee determinants.  
The indirect effect of bank size is reasonable in banking practice. First, auditor choice 
literature indicates that large organizations tend to use Big N auditors for differentiated 
audit quality and/or seeking better protections under Big N’s “deep pocket” and bank 
reputation. Second, large banks have better resources to accommodate complex 
financial profiles and have more liquidity buffer in response to risky financial 
transactions (Demsetz and Strahan 1997; Fields et al. 2004). In a sensitivity test to 
compare the different audit pricing patterns for large and small banks, Fields et al. 
(2004) find auditors price differently on financial risk measures for large banks and 
small banks.  Some asset types, e.g., mortgage loans positively affect fees for large 
banks but not for small banks. Fee premiums on capital adequacy are more important in 
small banks than in large banks, suggesting auditors adopt the regulators’ concern on 
capital adequacy for small banks. On liquidity, auditors are attentive to securities in 
small banks as securities are relied by small banks to meet their liquidity needs while 
large banks have more other options (Demsetz and Strahan 1997; Fields et al. 2004). 
Bank size also affects off-balance sheet activities. Cullen et al. (2012) find that the 
majority of off-balance sheet asset securitization transactions are undertaken by large 
banks as larger banks are more likely to undertake complex off-balance sheet 
transactions with better resources and expertise.  
Therefore, we expect that bank size shows dominating impact on audit fees, both 
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directly and via indirect effects on financial risks, off-balance sheet risks and auditor 
choices. 
 Auditor choice 
Big-N auditor choice is positively associated with audit fees with supportive evidence 
from audit fee studies on non-bank industries and on banks (Hay et al. 2006). However, 
the endogeneity issue associated with auditor choice that certain client attributes can 
influence the demand of audit quality and therefore affect auditor choice (Chaney et al. 
2004). The Heckman two-stage method is used to control for self-selection of auditors 
in prior studies with mixed results on fee premiums on Big-N auditors (Chaney et al. 
2004; and Giroux and Jones 2007).  Recent studies on self-selection bias in accounting 
research suggest that the Heckman method could be biased if there is no solid 
theoretical justification for excluding independent variables from the first stage 
regression and multicollinearity could be a critical issue in applying the Heckman 
approach (Tucker 2010; Francis et al. 2012). 
The PLS path modelling approach allows for the control on auditor self-selection by 
using Big N auditor choice as a mediator in the structural model. Align with prior 
literature, we expect a positive effect of Big N auditors on audit fees, in which 
following Chaney et al. (2004), effects of size and financial risks mediated by Big N 
auditor choice are also expected. 
 
IV. Research Method 
We employ PLS path modelling technique, which is believed to address several critical 
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issues with bank audit fee modelling, including high correlations among financial risk 
proxies, complex interrelationships between bank audit fees and its determinants in one 
simultaneous framework and also catering for the auditor self-selection problem at the 
same time.  
Off-balance sheet risk is proxied by a latent construct representing asset securitization 
risks, SECRISK, comprised of multiple manifest variables, total assets (ABS), the 
retained interests to total assets (RETINT), non-performance ratio of securitized assets 
(NPL_SEC) and the charge-off ratio of securitized assets (CHGOFF_SEC), consistent 
with Cullen et al. (2012) and Cheng et al. (2011). Each manifest variable in the 
SECRISK construct reflects one aspect of the risks associated with the off-balance sheet 
securitization activities.  
Following the result of a preliminary principal component analysis, we develop 6 latent 
constructs to represent on-balance-sheet financial risks, including C (the capital 
measure), E&M (the earnings and management performance measure), A (portfolio 
composition measure I, focusing on loan composition), INTSEC (portfolio composition 
II, focusing on other assets), TRANS (portfolio composition III, focusing on the 
liabilities accounts), and S (the interest rate sensitivity measure).4. The original manifest 
variables on on-balance sheet financial risks are replicated from the adapted Fields et al. 
model used in Cullen et al. (2012). Size and Big N auditor choice are single item 
                                                 
4 The grouping of on-balance-sheet financial risk measures based on the PCA procedure is not perfect. 
A better measurement method should consider more financial risk measures with additional data 
collection from the financial statement. We maintain the original dataset in the aim to keep 
consistency and comparability with the main test results.  
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constructs with only one manifest variable.5. Relation paths are established between 
latent constructs in accordance with the predictions and hypotheses. Fixed year effects 
are controlled by single-item variables for the years. 
<Insert Figure 1 Here> 
4.1 Sample and Data 
Our sample is restricted in the banking industry because, compared with other 
industries, banks have more resources and are more likely to take off-balance sheet 
activities. Specifically in this study, we focus on asset securitization, a typical 
off-balance sheet activity, which has been recently investigated in Cullen et al. (2012). 
To keep consistency and comparability, our sample is identical to the sample used in 
Cullen et al. (2012), comprising 2,424 US listed BHCs for the period from 2003 to 
2009. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Karaoglu 2005; Chen et al. 2008; Barth et al. 
2012, Cullen et al. 2012), Bank financial data and off-balance sheet securitization 
details are extracted from the FRB Y9-C Regulatory Filing database. Audit fees are 
extracted from the Audit-Analytics database.  
4.2 On-Balance Sheet Financial Risks 
We apply a principal component analysis on on-balance sheet financial risk variables to 
generate six latent constructs including two reflective constructs, two formative 
constructs and two single-item constructs. The on-balance sheet financial risk variables 
                                                 
5  To keep the PLS path model simple and concise, we exclude STDRET (the stock volatility) and 
SAVING (the savings institution indicator) which are included in Fields et al. (2004) from the PLS 
model, as STDRET and SAVING are not significant both in Fields et al. (2004) and Cullen et al. 
(2012). Our untabulated sensitivity tests also indicate STDRET and SAVING are not important 
determinants in bank audit fee determination.  
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are restricted to the financial risk measures in the adapted Fields et al. bank audit fee 
model (Cullen et al. 2012). We interpret the constructs based on CAMELS risk rating 
system which is a risk management and regulatory framework that has been 
world-widely used in the banking industry. It is notable that due to the data restriction, 
we admit our CAMELS financial risk measures and the interpretations are indicative 
rather than complete. 
 Capital adequacy (C) 
Bank capital serves to absorb losses, promote public confidence, help restrict excessive 
asset growth, and provide protection to depositors and the FDIC insurance funds. We 
use the total risk-based capital ratio as the primary measure for capital adequacy, which 
represents Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital ratios. FDIC sets minimum capital requirements at 
4% for Tier 1 capital and 8% for total risk-based capital. In addition, we also 
incorporate the intangible asset ratio into the capital adequacy construct based on the 
PCA analysis result. Due to the high intercorrelations between the two variables, the 
capital adequacy construct is defined as a reflective construct.  
Higher capital ratios do not necessarily indicate better capital adequacy. First, with the 
general 4% and 8% thresholds, the minimum capital requirement might vary for 
different banks, subject to additional capital requirements set by the bank’s primary 
regulators based on the bank’s risk status. In this sense, higher capital ratios might 
imply worse risk status and higher specifically-set minimum capital requirements. On 
the other hand, voluntary contributions in capital levels above the required minimums 
strengthen the banks’ capital adequacy. Second, the evaluation of capital adequacy 
should also consider other aspects of financial risks, including management capability, 
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asset quality and composition, earnings, growth prospect, contingent liabilities and the 
access to capital market. For example, problematic asset quality implies potential 
expected losses and a weakened capital position at a future point of time; a bank’s 
earnings performance may have an impact on the present and expected capitalization 
level; and serious contingent liabilities may lead to capital depletion. In this study, 
earnings, and asset quality are treated as separate latent constructs of financial risks, 
expected to inter-correlate with capital adequacy, and it should be noted, as in other 
studies, that most management information is private and unavailable in our dataset.  
 Performance measure: earnings and management performance (E&M) 
The reflective performance measure E&M consists of four manifest variables: the 
charge-off ratio (CHGOFF), non-performing loan ratio (NONP), the incidence of loss 
(LOSS) and the inefficiency ratio (INEFFICIENCY). LOSS and INEFFICIENCY 
represent different facets of earnings and management efficiency performance. LOSS 
focuses on overall earnings performance and highlights negative earnings; while 
INEFFICIENCY focuses on the bank’s operational performance. On the other hand, 
earnings performance is closely related to the loan quality, reflected by charge-off ratio 
(CHGOFF) and non-performing loan ratio (NONP), in which NONP reflects the level 
of problematic loan assets and CHGOFF reflects credit losses written off during the 
current period.  
 Portfolio composition I (A), portfolio composition II (INTSEC), Portfolio 
composition III (TRANS) and interest rate sensitivity (S) 
Portfolio composition is another important construct to be considered in evaluating 
asset quality. Commercial loans (COMMLOAN) and mortgage loans (MTGLOAN) are 
23 
 
two major components in the loan portfolio. We emphasize mortgage loans as mortgage 
loans consist of a large proportion of total loans and they are critically important loan 
composite especially in the recent decades, closely associated with the property market 
booming in early 2000s and the global financial crisis after 2007. By using principal 
component analysis another portfolio composition construct INTSEC is generated. This 
is formed by the ratio of interest rate derivatives to total assets (INTDERIV) and the 
ratio of securities to total assets (SECURITIES).  
We use TRANSACCT and SENSITIVE as single item constructs. TRANS 
(correspondent to TRANSACCT), the ratio of transaction accounts to total assets, 
represents the liabilities side of the bank portfolio; S (correspondent to SENSITIVE), 
represents the interest rate sensitivity. Noting INTDERIV can be viewed as an 
off-balance-sheet interest rate sensitivity measure, we recognize that there is a level of 
overlap among the portfolio composition constructs and the interest rate sensitivity 
construct. 
4.3 Off-Balance Sheet Risk: The Composite Asset Securitization Risk 
Construct (SECRISK) 
Following Cheng et al. (2011), we conduct a principal component analysis on five asset 
securitization risk variables, the securitized assets to total assets (ABS), the retained 
interests to total assets (RETINT), the charge-off ratio of securitized assets 
(CHGOFF_SEC), the non-performance ratio of securitized assets (NPL_SEC), and net 
securitization income to net income (SECINC). Consistent with Cullen et al. (2012), a 
composite asset securitization risk construct is generated including ABS, RETINT, 
CHGOFF_SEC and NPL_SEC. The composite asset securitization risk construct 
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(SECRISK) is a reflective construct due to the high correlations among the four 
manifest variables. SECINC is not closely correlated with other asset securitization risk 
variables, and therefore leaves out of the main tests by the principal component 
analysis.6  
4.4 Single Item Latent Constructs 
 Bank size (SIZE) 
Bank size is reflected with the natural logarithm of total assets. Hay et al. (2006) 
confirm a positive association between client size and audit fees and emphasize that size 
is an extremely critical explanatory factor for any model of audit fees. From six 
measures of client size used in prior literature, assets, sales revenue, and city population 
are identified as significant client size measures, while city population is only useful in 
municipal audit scenario, and sales revenue is not a typical bank size measure.   
 Big N auditor choice (BIGN) 
Auditor choice is a single item construct measured by a dummy variable, Big N, in 
which a BHC with a Big N auditor is assigned with value 1 and a BHC with a Non-big 
N auditor is assigned with value 0.  
V. PLS Path Modelling Results 
We use partial least squares (PLS) path modelling method, a component-based 
structural equation modelling technique to simultaneously validate the constructs and 
test multiple predictions and hypotheses (Chin 1998; Henseler et al. 2009). 
                                                 
6 We include SECINC as a single-item asset securitization risk construct in the sensitivity tests, and 
generate consistent results. 
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Bootstrapping based on 100 resamples is used to estimate the significance levels of the 
results. The analysis algorithm used in the tests is Warp PLS regression, which allows 
for non-linear U-curve, S-curve and J-curve relationships between latent constructs. 
Many relationships in nature, especially in economics and business areas, are nonlinear 
and follow a U-curve or S-curve pattern.7. Particularly in audit fee research, Carson et 
al. (2004) find that audit fees are not linearly related to client size as is typically 
assumed, and failure to control the non-linearity can potentially result in 
misspecification of the model and misinterpretation.  
We present the descriptive statistics for the manifest variables used in the PLS model in 
Table 1. The measurement model (construct) validity is assessed based on the results 
reported in Table 2 and Table 3. The testing results on H1 are reported in Table 4 in 
which direct and indirect effects of on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet financial 
risk, size, and Big N auditor on bank audit fees are analysed in terms of R2, path 
coefficients, and predictive relevance Q2 are presented. The testing results on H2 are 
presented in Table 5. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the manifest variables used in this study. 
Panel B shows the Pearson correlations between the manifest variables in the pooled 
sample. It is notable that the manifest variables are highly correlated with each other. 
                                                 
7  A standard PLS Regression algorithm is used in the sensitivity tests, whereby indicators’ weights, 
loadings and factor scores (also known as latent variable scores) are calculated based on an algorithm 
that maximizes the variance explained in the latent variable scores by the latent variable indicators, 
with the assumption that all the relationships between the latent constructs are linear relationships. 
The results based on a Warp PLS estimation and based on a standard PLS estimation are consistent. 
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For example, the size measure, LNTA, is significantly correlated with most of the 
on-balance sheet financial measures, including CHGOFF, NONP, INEFFICIENCY, 
COMMLOAN, INTERDIV, SENSITIVE, SECURITIES and TRANSACCT, and with 
all the off-balance securitization risk measures, saying ABS, RETINT, NPL_SEC and 
CHGOFF_SEC. The majority of the on-balance sheet financial risks are mutually 
correlated, consistent with the pattern displayed in Fields et al. (2004). On-balance sheet 
financial risk manifests are further correlated with the off-balance sheet securitization 
measures, consistent with our proposition that on-balance sheet financial risks are 
closely associated with the off-balance sheet exposures. In addition, the off-balance 
sheet risk manifests, ABS, RETINT, NPL_SEC and CHGOFF_SEC are highly 
correlated with each other. Overall correlation patterns suggest that high correlations are 
pervasive among the manifest variables in bank audit fee determination, which may be 
potentially problematic for an OLS regression model setting and lead to 
multicollinearity concerns. 
<Insert Table 1 Here> 
5.2 PLS Measurement model validity 
 Reflective measurement model  
Indicator loadings, average variance extracted (AVE), composite reliability, cross 
loadings, and Fornell-Larcker criterion capture the reliability and validity of the 
reflective measurement models (Jarvis et al. 2003; Henseler et al. 2009).  
Table 2 Panels A to C report the indicator loadings, composite reliability and AVEs for 
the reflective constructs. All of the three reflective constructs, Capital (C), Earnings and 
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Management Performance (E&M), and Off-Balance Sheet Risk (SECRISK), have 
composite reliability scores larger than 0.800. They exhibit good internal consistency 
and indicate that there is over an 80% possibility that the manifest variables in the 
constructs could simultaneously load when the latent variables increase. AVE measures 
the amount of variance that a latent variable component captures from its manifest 
variables in relation to total variance. All the reflective constructs have AVEs higher 
than the threshold value 0.500, indicating acceptable convergent validity. Indicator 
loadings for the reflective constructs are all higher than or close to 0.700 and significant 
at higher than 0.05 level threshold.   
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
The discriminant validity is evaluated with cross-loadings and Fornell-Larcker criterion. 
As suggested in Table 3 Panel B, the loading of each reflective indicator is higher for its 
designated construct than for any of the other constructs; and each of the constructs 
loads highest with its own manifest items. Untabulated p-values for the cross-loadings 
indicate that the reflective constructs differ significantly with one another. The 
Fornell-Larcker criterion test is reported in Table 3 Panel A, which requires the latent 
constructs share more variance with its assigned manifest indicators than with any other 
latent variables. Hence, the AVE of each latent construct should be greater than the 
latent construct’s highest squared correlation with any other latent construct. Table 3 
Panel A suggests that Fornell-Larcker criterion is conformed to for all the three 
reflective constructs. 
<Insert Table 3 Here> 
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 Formative measurement model 
The validity of formative constructs is assessed with the magnitudes, significance and 
VIFs of the indicator weights, as well as the inter-construct correlations between the 
assessed formative construct and all the other constructs (Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer 2001; Jarvis et al. 2003; Henseler et al. 2009).  
Table 2 Panel D and Panel E show that both the formative indicators are significant at 
0.050 levels, suggesting the indicator is relevant for the designated formative construct. 
The formative indicator VIFs are all below 2.5 indicating multicollinearity is not a 
problem for the formative constructs. Table 3 Panel A shows correlations between the 
formative and all the other constructs are all less than 0.250, suggesting the formative 
constructs differ sufficiently from one another.  
5.3 Prediction and Hypotheses Testing 
 On-Balance Sheet Financial Risks, Off-Balance Sheet Risk and Audit Fees 
Table 4 presents the effect of each latent variable on FEES for the period 2003-2009. 
Panel A indicates that the model explains 88.4% total variance of bank audit fees (R2). 
Average path coefficient (APC) and average R-squared (ARS) are at 0.156 and 0.215 
respectively, both below 0.001 significance level8. Together with an average variance 
inflation factor (AVIF) at 1.360, the PLS path model exhibits a good model fit.  
<Insert Table 4 Here> 
                                                 
8  The P values are calculated via resampling estimations coupled with Bonferroni-like correlations, 
provided by WarpPLS application package. 
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The PLS path results are summarized in groups. The first group lists the results of the 
single path blocks. The second and third groups report the direct relations of latent 
constructs with BIGN (auditor choice) and SECRISK (off-balance sheet securitization 
risks) respectively. The last group lists the direct impact of all the tested independent 
factors on audit fee (FEES) determination after considering the mutual relationships 
among those independent factors simultaneously. Table 4 Panel B reports the total 
effects of latent variables on FEES, which sums up both direct path effects as well as 
indirect path effects.9. The provision of total effects together with the path coefficients 
in Table 4 Panel A and Panel B allows us to evaluate both the direct paths in the PLS 
path model but also the overall (direct and indirect) effects of specific latent constructs.  
We predict an association between on-balance sheet financial risks and off-balance 
sheet asset securitization risks. For the comprehensive securitization risk measure 
SECRISK, the PLS result indicates that SIZE, C, E&M, A, and INTSEC are 
significantly associated with SECRISK. Specifically, large BHCs tend to have higher 
                                                 
9  The total effect sums up all the direct and indirect effects for latent variables. For example, in 
addition to the direct effect on FEES, SIZE also affects other latent variables in the path model and 
those latent variables then further affect FEES. The statistics of total effect are the statistical sum of 
all the direct and indirect paths, in terms of the path coefficients and their significance levels. Having 
access to total effects can be critical in the evaluation of downstream effects of latent variables that 
are mediated by other latent variables, especially in complex models with multiple mediating effects 
along concurrent paths (Kock 2012).  
 Note our complex PLS path model establishes a number of indirect effects9 (also known as 
mediation effects, e.g., the indirect relation between SIZE and SECRISK via C (capital); the indirect 
relation between SIZE and FEES via C and then BIGN, etc. (see Hoyle and Kenny 1999), calculated 
based on bootstrapping estimations (Preacher et al. 2007). Suppose Y has direct relations with X and 
M, and M has a direct relation with X as presented in Equations (1) and (2): 
rMbXcbY  10 '         (1) 
    XaaM 10                    (2) 
 The indirect effect of X on Y via M is )()|( 101 XaabXf  , and 





level of securitization risks, which is consistent with the fact that large banks are more 
active in asset securitization activities as shown in the descriptive statistics. Banks at 
higher capital ratio (C), with worse earnings and management performance (E&M), 
more involved in mortgage loans (A) and derivative transactions (INTSEC) are likely to 
have higher off-balance sheet securitization risks. These results are consistent with our 
prediction, and prior literature that banks use off-balance sheet securitization activities 
to pursue earning management and liquidity management purposes (Karaoglu 2005; 
Pavel and Phillis 1987).  
The last group in Table 4 Panel A reports the direct path results of latent variables on 
FEES, which provides consistent results compared to Cullen et al. (2012). The model 
explains 88.4% FEES variations. In terms of the impact of off-balance sheet risks on 
audit fees, SECRISK is positively associated with FEES. Noting the PLS path model 
used in this section has already allowed for the multicollinearity among manifests and 
inter-relations among latent constructs, the PLS results in Table 4 are consistent with 
Cullen et al. (2012), providing very strong supportive evidence to the positive 
association between off-balance sheet securitization risks and audit fees. Consistent 
with Cullen et al. (2012), FEES are higher for BHCs with worse earnings and 
management performance (E&M), higher capital ratio and higher intangible asset ratio 
(C), higher interest rate derivatives and lower level of securities (INTSEC). FEES are 
higher for banks with more commercial loans and less mortgage loans as formed in 
asset composition (A). In addition, SIZE is the major driver of FEES and there is a fee 
premium on BIGN.  
The total effect results reported in Table 4 Panel B also provide supportive evidence to 
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H1. Panel B reports the total effects of latent variables on FEES, by summing up both 
direct path effect as well as indirect path effects. In addition to the dominant effect of 
SIZE on audit fees, there are slightly changes in the magnitudes of the total effects of 
other latent constructs compared with the direct effects in Panel A, due to the 
incorporation of indirect effects. However, except for INTSEC that is no longer 
significant after considering indirect effects of INTSEC on FEES, all the significant 
associations between other control latent constructs, including the off-balance sheet risk 
latent construct SECRISK, and FEES still hold after considering all the direct and 
indirect paths. Together with the results in Panel A, the PLS path modelling tests 
strongly confirm that auditors can be attentive to the off-balance sheet securitization 
risks for the period 2003-2009, and this result hold robust after considering mutual 
correlations among BHC size, auditor choice, on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
financial risks.  
 The Impact of the GFC on Bank Audit Fee Determination 
We present a pre-GFC and during-GFC comparison with the PLS path modelling 
methodology. Consistent with Cullen et al. (2012), SECRISK are positively significant 
to FEES before the GFC both on the direct path effect (Panel B, Table 5) and on the 
total effect (Panel C, Table 5); and for the period after 2007, SECRISK is only 
marginally significant (p = 0.081). The group difference statistics indicate that there is 
no significant change on SECRISK with the onset of the GFC. This result is consistent 
with the results reported in Cullen et al. (2012).  
Except for the changes on audit fee determinations with the onset of the GFC, the PLS 
path model also reports the migration of the inter-correlations among latent constructs 
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and the migration of the impact of other control latent constructs on audit fees (Panel B, 
Table 5). With regard to the relationships between financial risks and off-balance sheet 
securitization risks, SIZE, C, E&M, A, INTSEC are significantly associated with 
SECRISK both before and after the GFC, suggesting a persistent association of 
financial risks and securitization activities regardless of the GFC. The group 
comparison indicates that the significance of SIZE on SECRISK has increased after 
2007; there is a significant change in the effect of INTSEC on SECRISK, with a 
positively significant pre-GFC coefficient but a negatively significant during-GFC 
coefficient.  
A possible concern of the H2 test with the PLS model is the changes in the validity of 
the measurement model for the pre-and-during periods. Table 5 Panel A indicates that 
none of the reflective and formative constructs has changed significantly after the onset 
of the GFC, indicating good validation and stability of the measurement models for the 
pre-GFC and during-GFC subgroups, which ensure the general reliability of the 
sub-sample tests..  
In summary, overall PLS path modelling results provide further confirmation to the 
OLS results presented in Cullen et al. (2012), after considering the inter-correlations 
among the latent constructs and allowing for multicollinearity among manifest variables 
within the constructs.  
 Size Effect 
Table 4 Panel A and Panel B jointly suggest that the effect of SIZE on BHC audit fees is 
not only a direct effect from SIZE to FEES, but also via indirect paths from SIZE to 
other audit fee determinants. SIZE is a significant determinant for Big N auditor choice 
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(BIGN), financial risks (C, E&M, A, INTSEC, S and TRANS), and the composite 
off-balance sheet risk (SECRISK), indicating that SIZE pervasively and significantly 
influences all the independent latent constructs in the bank audit fee model. SIZE also 
has a major direct-effect on FEES which is positive and significant. Table 4 Panel B 
suggests that total effect of SIZE on FEES is extremely high at 0.88 (p < 0.001), 
indicating SIZE is a dominant determinant in BHC audit fee model, consistent with Hay 
et al. (2006).  
Additionally, the dominating effect of SIZE on FEES persists before and through the 
GFC period (Panels B and C, in Table 5). The significant impacts of SIZE on auditor 
choice and on off-balance sheet activities are also persistent, while the group 
comparison indicates that there is an increasing effect of SIZE on securitization 
activities (SECRISK) after the onset of the GFC.  
 Auditor choice 
Table 4 confirms a positive effect of Big N auditors on audit fees after allowing for the 
intercorrelations between BIGN and other control latent constructs in the model (coef. = 
0.17, p<0.001). Moreover, the PLS model confirms endogeneity of Big N auditor 
choice. Specifically, 35.0% variations in BIGN can be explained by SIZE, C, E&M, A, 
INTSEC, S, and TRANS in this PLS model. Big N auditors are chosen by large BHCs 
(SIZE), BHCs with higher capital ratio (C), better earnings and management 
performance (E&M)10, higher level of commercial loans and lower level of mortgage 
loans (A), more involved in derivative transactions but less involved in security 
                                                 
10 See Table 2 Panel A, the composition of the reflective measurement model for E&M. 
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investment (INTSEC)11, of lower interest rate sensitivity (S) and BHCs with a higher 
ratio of transaction accounts. The group comparison in Table 5 Panel B suggests that the 
effect of SIZE, C, A, S and TRANS on BIGN persist before and during the GFC.   
 
VI. Conclusion and Discussion 
This study has contributed to accounting research community as follows. The 
introduction of PLS path modelling in archival auditing studies provide an additional 
analytical tool for accounting and auditing researchers. The rich functions provided by 
PLS technique will facilitate researchers to address multiple interlinked research 
questions simultaneously. By combining PCA analysis and linear regression technique 
in one path model framework, PLS path modeling approach allows researchers to not 
only focus on one layer of the hypotheses but also be able to test interrelated 
hypothesized relations among multiple latent constructs in one comprehensive PLS path 
model. The intercorrelations among independent variables, multicollinearity and 
self-selection of auditors are critical issues in empirical auditing research.  
Prior bank audit fee research has predicted audit fee determinations primarily with OLS 
approach (Fields et al. 2004; Boo and Sharma 2008; Ettredge et al. 2009; Doogar et al. 
2012), combined with PCA analyses for certain inter-correlated variables (Cullen et al. 
2012). This PLS study converges them into one simultaneous analysis under PLS 
framework. The results after differentiating latent constructs, establishing multiple 
paths, and controlling the mediation and moderation effects provide strong supportive 
                                                 
11 See Table 2 Panel E, the composition of the formative measurement model for INTSEC. 
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evidence for Cullen et al. (2012) with regard to H1 and H2. This confirms a positive 
association between off-balance sheet financial risk and audit fees for the pooled period 
(2003-2009) and for the pre-GFC period, which accounts for both direct impacts of 
securitization risks on audit fees and indirect impacts via other latent risk constructs. 
Furthermore, size and on-balance sheet financial risks drive off-balance sheet risks, 
which is consistent with prior literature (Karaoglu 2005). Our results support prior 
literature that firm size is the dominant audit fee determinant (Hay et al. 2006) and 
uphold the pervasive impact of size on other audit fee determinants. In addition, the 
results conform to the self-selection argument (Chaney et al. 2004; Knechel and 
Willekens 2006) and suggest that Big N auditor choice is affected by the entity size and 
financial risks, and further influence audit fees.  
We acknowledge some limitations of PLS technique. First, the association between a 
manifest variable within a latent construct and the dependent variable cannot be 
quantified with the PLS technique. Although this can be solved by disaggregating the 
latent construct into several single item constructs (i.e., each construct has only one 
manifest variable), however, the disaggregation of latent constructs will make the PLS 
path model even more complicated. Second, formative latent constructs are hard to 
interpret especially when positive and negative signs show together in one latent 
construct. Third, as a so-called second generation technique, there is not a universally 
recognized goodness of fit criterion on PLS path modelling and many statistical 
methods are still under development within the PLS context. Therefore, before this 
technique has been widely accepted in archival accounting community, we recommend 
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 Figure 1: The PLS Path Model for BHC Audit Fees 
 
 























Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Manifest Variables 
Panel A: Sample Distribution 
Latent 
Construct Manifest Variable Pooled Before the GFC (2003-2006) During the GFC (2007-2009) 
Difference 
in Means1 
  Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev T-Stat. P-Value 
N  2,424  1560  864    
          
FEES LNAF 12.722 1.293 12.557 1.312 13.021 1.201 -8.80 <.0001 
SIZE LNTA 21.590 1.618 21.436 1.623 21.867 1.573 -6.38 <.0001 
BIGN BIGN 0.491 0.500 0.522 0.500 0.435 0.496 4.14 <.0001 
E&M CHGOFF 0.336 0.359 0.236 0.245 0.515 0.451 -16.83 <.0001 
 NONP 0.014 0.023 0.007 0.008 0.027 0.032 -18.22 <.0001 
 LOSS 0.108 0.311 0.016 0.126 0.275 0.447 -16.70 <.0001 
 INEFFICIENCY 0.772 0.154 0.738 0.098 0.833 0.209 -12.57 <.0001 
C CAPRATIO 13.592 5.063 13.759 4.753 13.289 5.569 2.09 0.037 
 INTANG 0.018 0.023 0.017 0.022 0.020 0.023 -2.90 0.004 
A COMMLOAN 0.167 0.102 0.167 0.102 0.167 0.101 0.01 0.989 
 MTGLOAN 0.296 0.150 0.304 0.155 0.283 0.139 3.38 0.001 
INTSEC SENSITIVE 0.089 0.225 0.106 0.248 0.059 0.174 5.39 <.0001 
 INTDERIV 0.277 2.355 0.254 2.198 0.320 2.616 -0.63 0.530 
S SECURITIES 0.205 0.120 0.219 0.126 0.179 0.103 8.55 <.0001 
TRANS TRANSACCT 0.570 0.152 0.583 0.153 0.547 0.148 5.67 <.0001 
SECRISK ABS 0.0219249 0.2005766 0.0263358 0.2437448 0.0139608 0.0743608 1.86 0.064 
 RETINT 0.0006119 0.0050917 0.0006417 0.0047917 0.0005581 0.0055953 0.37 0.711 
 NPL_SEC 0.0010193 0.0091567 0.0010127 0.010028 0.0010311 0.0073312 -0.05 0.959 
 CHGOFF_SEC 0.0001946 0.0024736 0.0002017 0.0028596 0.0001819 0.0015512 0.22 0.825 
Note 1: Satterthwaite t test is used. This is an alternative to the pooled-variance t test and is used when the assumption that the two populations have unequal variances. It provides a t statistic that symptotically 
approaches a t distribution, allowing for an approximate t test to be calculated. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% based on two-tailed tests. 
See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Panel B: Pearson Correlations (N=2,424 Sample Period: 2003-2009) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. LNAF 1.000                  
                   
2. LNTA 0.913 1.000                 
 (<.0001)                  
3. BIGN 0.584 0.537 1.000                
 (<.0001) (<.0001)                 
4. CHGOFF 0.241 0.198 0.015 1.000               
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.459)                
5. NONP 0.140 0.082 -0.051 0.502 1.000              
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.012) (<.0001)               
6. LOSS 0.089 0.030 -0.080 0.505 0.569 1.000             
 (<.0001) (0..138) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)              
7. 
INEFFICIENCY -0.056 -0.134 -0.178 0.285 0.361 0.574 1.000            
 (0.006) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)             
8. CAPRATIO 0.031 -0.018 0.052 0.127 -0.077 -0.079 -0.111 1.000           
 (0.131) (0.369) (0.010) (<.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (<.0001)            
9. INTANG 0.418 0.399 0.240 0.102 -0.057 -0.072 -0.121 0.353 1.000          
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.005) (0.000) (<.0001) (<.0001)           
10. 
COMMLOAN 0.181 0.163 0.197 0.059 -0.052 -0.060 -0.100 -0.036 0.035 1.000         
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (<.0001) (0.078) (0.081)          
11.MTGLOAN -0.049 0.015 0.003 -0.064 -0.063 -0.060 0.017 0.015 0.012 -0.430 1.000        
 (0.016) (0.448) (0.883) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.407) (0.448) (0.562) (<.0001)         
12. SENSITIVE 0.196 0.201 0.171 -0.030 -0.089 -0.066 -0.136 0.035 0.086 0.202 -0.177 1.000       
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.139) (<.0001) (0.001) (<.0001) (0.085) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)        
13. INTDERIV 0.367 0.391 0.112 0.087 0.048 -0.014 -0.022 -0.016 0.100 0.043 0.061 0.039 1.000      
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.019) (0.491) (0.272) (0.430) (<.0001) (0.034) (0.003) (0.052)       
14. 
SECURITIES 0.004 0.028 0.189 -0.117 -0.107 -0.144 -0.071 0.291 -0.075 -0.034 0.117 -0.114 -0.075 1.000     
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 (0.861) (0.175) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.001) (<.0001) (0.000) (0.090) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.000)      
15. 
TRANSACCT 0.119 0.124 0.209 -0.091 -0.223 0.027 -0.224 -0.079 0.177 0.280 -0.047 0.273 -0.022 0.116 1.000    
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.019) (<.0001) (0.258) (<.0001)     
16. ABS 0.166 0.169 0.057 0.075 0.037 0.001 -0.024 0.055 0.153 -0.062 0.147 0.048 0.107 -0.038 -0.005 1.000   
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.068) (0.980) (0.229) (0.007) (<.0001) (0.002) (<.0001) (0.018) (<.0001) (0.058) (0.805)    
17. RETINT 0.228 0.230 0.120 0.117 0.083 0.039 -0.059 0.097 0.117 -0.035 -0.021 0.036 0.142 0.009 -0.066 0.264 1.000  
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.052) (0.004) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.086) (0.303) (0.078) (<.0001) (0.665) (0.001) (<.0001)   
18. NPL_SEC 0.257 0.264 0.093 0.092 0.091 0.022 -0.033 0.037 0.162 -0.063 0.173 0.058 0.228 -0.055 -0.020 0.731 0.355 1.000 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.289) (0.110) (0.066) (<.0001) (0.002) (<.0001) (0.004) (<.0001) (0.007) (0.337) (<.0001) (<.0001)  
19. 
CHGOFF_SEC 0.181 0.183 0.080 0.143 0.036 0.006 -0.057 0.104 0.126 -0.026 -0.046 0.017 0.148 -0.045 -0.058 0.251 0.515 0.311 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.077) (0.786) (0.005) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.194) (0.025) (0.403) (<.0001) (0.026) (0.005) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Note: Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. The Pearson correlations between the individual asset securitization risk variables are presented in Table 1. 




Table 2: Measurement Model Reliability and Validity 
Panel A: Earnings and Management Performance (E&M): Reflective Construct 
(Composite Reliability = 0.858, AVE = 0.603) 
 Loading Standard Error t-statistics p-value 
CHGOFF 0.73 0.04 16.68 <0.001 
NONP 0.79 0.09 8.69 <0.001 
LOSS 0.87 0.03 28.90 <0.001 
INEFFICIENCY 0.70 0.07 10.04 <0.001 
 
Panel B: Capital (C): Reflective Construct 
(Composite Reliability = 0.807, AVE = 0.677) 
 Loading Standard Error t-statistics p-value 
CAPRATIO 0.82 0.23 3.64 <0.001 
INTANG 0.82 0.18 4.52 <0.001 
 
Panel C: Off-Balance Sheet Risk (SECRISK): Reflective Construct 
(Composite Reliability = 0.833, AVE = 0.556) 
 Loading Standard Error t-statistics p-value 
ABS 0.78 0.27 2.94 0.002 
RETINT 0.69 0.23 3.03 0.001 
CHGOFF_SEC 0.66 0.36 1.84 0.033 
NPL_SEC 0.84 0.21 4.03 <0.001 
Note: indicator loadings higher than 0.700 and significant at the 0.050 level are desired for reflective indicators, 
demonstrating acceptable indicator reliability.  
 
Panel D: Portfolio _ Asset Structure (A): Formative Construct 
 Weight Standard Error t-statistics p-value VIF 
COMMLOAN 0.59 0.02 26.86 <0.001 1.227 
MTGLOAN -0.59 0.02 -24.63 <0.001 1.227 
 
Panel E: Portfolio _ Interest Rate Derivatives and Securities (INTSEC): Formative 
Construct 
 Weight Standard Error t-statistics p-value VIF 
INTDERIV 0.68 0.31 -2.08 0.015 1.006 
SECURITIES -0.68 0.33 2.17 0.019 1.006 
Note: indicator weights significant at the 0.050 level suggests that an indicator is relevant for the formative construct, 
demonstrating sufficient indicator validity.  




Table 3 Discriminant Validity 
Panel A: Construct Correlations and Square Roots of AVE Statistics (N=2424) 
 Reflective Constructs Formative Constructs Single Item Constructs 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.E&M 0.776         
2.C -0.058 0.823        
3.SECRISK 0.062 0.172 0.746       
4.A 0.004 -0.01 -0.095 0.846      
5.INTSEC 0.118 -0.055 0.175 0.054 0.733     
6.S -0.102 0.073 0.055 0.224 0.104 1    
7. TRANS -0.228 0.172 -0.047 0.193 -0.095 0.273 1   
8.SIZE 0.059 0.231 0.284 0.087 0.248 0.201 0.124 1  
9.BIGN -0.093 0.178 0.116 0.115 -0.053 0.171 0.209 0.537 1 
Note: Square roots of average variances extracted (AVE's) are shown on diagonal for reflective constructs 
(Constructs 1 to 3). Off-diagonal elements are the correlations between the latent variables calculated in PLS. AVEs 
shown on diagonal for formative constructs (Constructs 4 to 5) are only indicative rather than meaningful. 
 
 
Panel B:  Item Loading and Cross Loading on Indicators in Reflective Constructs 
 
Note: Cross-loading is obtained by calculating the correlation between the standardized latent variable scores and the 
standardized value of the item. The discriminant validity criterion for reflective constructs requires the loading of 
each indicator is higher for its designated construct than for any of the other constructs, and each of the constructs 
loads highest with its own items. It can be inferred that the model’s constructs differ significantly with one another 
(Jarvis et al. 2003; Henseler et al. 2009). 
 
  
 Reflective Constructs Formative Constructs Single Item Constructs 
 E&M C SECRISK A INTSEC S TRANS SIZE BIGN 
CHGOFF 0.734 0.139 0.140 0.072 0.139 -0.030 -0.091 0.198 0.015 
NONP 0.791 -0.081 0.084 0.006 0.105 -0.089 -0.223 0.082 -0.051 
LOSS 0.867 -0.092 0.022 0.000 0.089 -0.066 -0.173 0.030 -0.080 
INEFFICIENCY 0.703 -0.141 -0.056 -0.069 0.033 -0.136 -0.224 -0.134 -0.178 
CAPRATIO -0.047 0.823 0.094 -0.030 -0.210 0.035 0.105 -0.018 0.052 
INTANG -0.049 0.823 0.188 0.014 0.119 0.086 0.177 0.399 0.240 
ABS 0.028 0.126 0.783 -0.124 0.099 0.048 -0.005 0.169 0.057 
RETINT 0.060 0.130 0.690 -0.008 0.091 0.036 -0.066 0.230 0.120 
CHOFF_SEC 0.041 0.140 0.663 0.011 0.132 0.017 -0.058 0.183 0.080 
NPL_SEC 0.056 0.121 0.835 -0.139 0.193 0.058 -0.019 0.264 0.093 
COMMLOAN -0.050 0.000 -0.064 0.846 0.053 0.202 0.280 0.163 0.197 
MTGLOAN -0.057 0.017 0.096 -0.846 -0.038 -0.177 -0.047 0.015 0.003 
INTDERIV 0.030 0.051 0.212 -0.010 0.733 0.039 -0.023 0.391 0.112 
SECURITIES -0.143 0.132 -0.045 -0.089 -0.733 -0.114 0.116 0.028 0.189 
SENSITIVE -0.102 0.073 0.055 0.224 0.104 1    
TRANSACCT -0.228 0.172 -0.047 0.193 -0.095 0.273 1   
LNTA 0.059 0.231 0.284 0.087 0.248 0.201 0.124 1  
BIGN -0.093 0.178 0.116 0.115 -0.053 0.171 0.209 0.537 1 
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Table 4: Audit Fees and Asset Securitization Risks: Result from the PLS Model 
 
Panel A: Path Coefficients, Effect Size, Coefficient of Determination (R2) and 
Predictive Relevance (Q2) 
 
(PLS Path Model Fitting: APC=0.156, P<0.001; ARS=0.215, P<0.001; AVIF=1.360, Good if < 5) 
Estimation  Latent  Dependent Path 
Coef. SE P value
d Block VIFa R
2b Q2c 




SIZE C 0.25 0.08 0.001 0.063 0.076 
SIZE E&M 0.09 0.02 <0.001 0.008 0.008 
SIZE A 0.13 0.02 <0.001 0.017 0.017 
SIZE INTSEC 0.58 0.32 0.035 0.334 0.344 
SIZE S 0.22 0.04 <0.001 0.050 0.051 




SIZE BIGN 0.56 0.03 <0.001 1.187 0.350 0.351 
C BIGN 0.02 0.01 0.077 1.096 
E&M BIGN -0.08 0.02 <0.001 1.079 
A BIGN 0.05 0.02 0.002 1.084 
INTSEC BIGN -0.18 0.03 <0.001 1.114 
S BIGN 0.03 0.02 0.043 1.164 




SIZE SECRISK 0.23 0.05 <0.001 1.398 0.205 0.216 
C SECRISK 0.16 0.05 <0.001 1.083 
E&M SECRISK 0.09 0.02 <0.001 1.023 
A SECRISK -0.22 0.11 0.019 1.012 




SIZE FEES 0.76 0.01 <0.001 2.197 0.884 0.884 
BIGN FEES 0.17 0.01 <0.001 1.576 
C FEES 0.04 0.01 <0.001 1.171 
A FEES 0.05 0.01 <0.001 1.116 
E&M FEES 0.10 0.01 <0.001 1.588 
INTSEC FEES 0.02 0.01 0.049 1.297 
S FEES -0.01 0.02 0.310 1.202 
TRANS FEES 0.02 0.02 0.117 1.217 
SECRISK FEES 0.03 0.01 <0.001 1.455 
Note: a. These VIFs are for the latent constructs (predictors), with reference to the dependent latent variables 
(criteria). b. Coefficient of determination (R2) measures the variance of a dependent latent variable explained by its 
latent constructs (predictors) relative to its total variance. Values of 0.67, 0.33 and 0.19 are  regarded as criteria for 
substantial, moderate and weak explanation power. c. Predictive relevance (Q2)  measures how well the omitted data 
are estimated by the model.   D D DD OEQ ))/()((12 Where E represents square of prediction error, 
and O represents square of original omitted values. The  proposed threshold value is Q2>0, indicating the predictive 
relevance of the entire structural model is better than mean replacement. Higher Q2 value indicates better predictive 




Table 4 (Continued) 
Panel B: Summed Total Effects of Latent Constructs on Bank Audit Fees 
 
Latent Construct Path Total Effect SE P value 
SIZE FEES 0.88 0.01 <0.001 
BIGN FEES 0.17 0.01 <0.001 
C FEES 0.04 0.01 <0.001 
A FEES 0.05 0.01 <0.001 
E&M FEES 0.09 0.01 <0.001 
INTSEC FEES -0.01 0.02 0.327 
S FEES 0.00 0.02 0.413 
TRANS FEES 0.03 0.02 0.029 
SECRISK FEES 0.03 0.01 <0.001 
 
  
e Shift of the Impact of Asset Securitization Risks on Audit Fees before and during the GFC 
Group Comparison on the Pre-GFC and During-GFC Subsamples 
 Pre-GFC (N=1560) Post_GFC (N=864) Group Diff.* 
est Variable Loading or Weight SE P value Loading or Weight SE P value t-stat. P value 
0.76 0.21 <0.001 0.87 0.03 <0.001 -0.40 0.345 
F 0.49 0.22 0.012 0.74 0.05 <0.001 -0.86 0.195 
0.57 0.23 0.007 0.75 0.12 <0.001 -0.57 0.285 
IENCY 0.69 0.19 <0.001 0.69 0.08 <0.001 0.02 0.492 
TIO 0.81 0.36 0.013 0.85 0.34 0.006 -0.07 0.470 
0.81 0.35 0.010 0.85 0.25 <0.001 -0.08 0.467 
0.78 0.32 0.008 0.87 0.16 <0.001 -0.21 0.416 
0.76 0.23 <0.001 0.51 0.28 0.032 0.67 0.253 
C 0.82 0.26 <0.001 0.91 0.19 <0.001 -0.24 0.404 
E 0.67 0.36 0.032 0.76 0.23 <0.001 -0.18 0.429 
OAN 0.59 0.02 <0.001 0.59 0.04 <0.001 0.02 0.490 
AN -0.59 0.03 <0.001 -0.59 0.04 <0.001 -0.02 0.492 
IV 0.68 0.35 0.025 0.69 0.38 0.035 -0.01 0.494 
TIES -0.68 0.31 0.015 -0.69 0.38 0.036 0.02 0.494 
and weights are reported for formative measures. One-tailed p values are reported. The WarpPLS software only generates SE and Coefficient 
mate because they are calculated manually using the SEs and Coefficients, which are rounded to two decimal places in WarpPLS.  
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel B: the Structural Model: Group Comparison on the Pre-GFC and During-GFC Subsamples 
      Pre-GFC (N=1560) Post-GFC (n=864) Group Diff.b 
Estimation Latent Dependent 
Path Coef. SE P value R2a 
Path 
SE P value R2a t-stat. P value 
Block Construct Variable Coef. 
Single Path 
Block 
SIZE C 0.23 0.16 0.074 0.052 0.29 0.12 0.009 0.086 -0.28 0.389 
SIZE E&M -0.16 0.16 0.157 0.024 0.04 0.07 0.307 0.001 -0.89 0.186 
SIZE A 0.13 0.02 <0.001 0.016 0.17 0.04 <0.001 0.028 -1.05 0.146 
SIZE INTSEC 0.57 0.38 0.068 0.321 -0.60 0.47 0.102 0.361 1.88 0.030 
SIZE S 0.12 0.04 0.001 0.014 -0.29 0.03 <0.001 0.086 7.10 0.000 




SIZE BIGN 0.56 0.03 <0.001   0.59 0.04 <0.001   -0.55 0.292 
C BIGN 0.02 0.02 0.228   0.02 0.02 0.185   -0.03 0.487 
E&M BIGN 0.01 0.02 0.322   -0.05 0.03 0.048   1.62 0.053 
A BIGN 0.07 0.02 0.001   0.06 0.03 0.020   0.19 0.425 
INTSEC BIGN -0.17 0.02 <0.001   0.16 0.03 <0.001   -8.64 0.000 
S BIGN -0.05 0.02 0.002 -0.01 0.03 0.322 -1.18 0.119 




SIZE SECRISK 0.21 0.05 <0.001   0.38 0.12 <0.001   -1.56 0.059 
C SECRISK 0.18 0.08 0.009   0.14 0.06 0.014   0.35 0.363 
E&M SECRISK 0.13 0.06 0.015   0.10 0.02 <0.001   0.44 0.330 
A SECRISK -0.26 0.12 0.017   -0.04 0.02 0.011   -1.30 0.096 




SIZE FEES 0.75 0.02 <0.001   0.78 0.02 <0.001   -1.10 0.136 
BIGN FEES 0.17 0.01 <0.001   0.17 0.02 <0.001   0.00 0.500 
C FEES 0.06 0.03 0.012   0.00 0.02 0.426   1.53 0.063 
A FEES 0.05 0.01 <0.001   0.07 0.01 <0.001   -1.04 0.149 
E&M FEES 0.06 0.07 0.177   0.06 0.02 0.002   0.01 0.496 
INTSEC FEES 0.02 0.02 0.135   -0.03 0.04 0.203   1.40 0.081 
S FEES 0.01 0.02 0.240   -0.01 0.01 0.158   0.98 0.164 
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TRANS FEES 0.02 0.01 0.018   0.01 0.02 0.313   0.77 0.220 
SECRISK FEES 0.04 0.01 <0.001 0.876 0.03 0.02 0.081 0.888 0.27 0.393 
      APC=0.182, P<0.001; ARS=0.208, P<0.001; AVIF=2.192, Good if < 5 
APC=0.161, P<0.001; ARS=0.252, P<0.001: 
AVIF=1.378, Good if < 5     
Note: a. Coefficient of determination (R2) measures the variance of a dependent latent variable explained by its latent constructs (predictors) relative to its total variance. Values of 0.67, 0.33 and 
0.19 are regarded as criteria for substantial, moderate and weak explanation power. b. We use an approach discussed by Wynne Chin, and documented by Keil et al. (2000) to do the group 





Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel C: Total Effect on Audit Fees: Group Comparison on the Pre-GFC and 
During-GFC Subsamples 
    Pre-GFC (N=1560) Post-GFC (n=864) Group Diff. 
Latent 
Construct Path Effect SE P value Effect SE P value t-stat. P value 
SIZE FEES 0.87 0.02 <0.001 0.93 0.02 <0.001 -1.77 0.038 
BIGN FEES 0.17 0.01 <0.001 0.17 0.02 <0.001 0.00 0.500 
C FEES 0.07 0.03 0.012 0.01 0.02 0.287 1.39 0.082 
A FEES 0.05 0.02 0.002 0.08 0.02 <0.001 -1.14 0.127 
E&M FEES 0.07 0.07 0.158 0.06 0.02 0.006 0.13 0.448 
INTSEC FEES -0.01 0.02 0.400 -0.01 0.04 0.380 0.15 0.439 
S FEES 0.00 0.02 0.428 -0.01 0.01 0.148 0.65 0.259 
TRANS FEES 0.04 0.01 0.001 0.03 0.02 0.051 0.39 0.348 




Appendix: Definitions for Constructs and Manifest Variables in the PLS Path 
Model 
The manifest variables in the PLS path model are the same as those employed in Model 
(1) with the OLS regression methodology. 
 
Construct Manifest Variable Description 
A  Portfolio composition measure I, formative construct; 
 COMMLOAN Commercial loans/gross loans; 
 MTGLOAN Mortgage loans/gross loans. 
   
BIGN  Auditor choice measure, single item construct; 
 BIGN 1 for the client of a Big N auditor, 0 otherwise. 
   
C  Capital adequacy measure, reflective construct; 
 CAPRATIO Risk-adjusted capital ratio; 
 INTANG Intangible assets/total assets. 
   
E&M  Earning and management performance measure, reflective construct; 
 CHGOFF Net charge-offs/allowance for loan and lease losses; 
 NONP Non-performing loans/gross loans; 
 INEFFICIENCY The ratio of total operating expense to total revenue. 
   
FEES  Audit fee measure, single item construct; 
 LNAF The natural logarithm of audit fee. 
   
GFC  GFC indicator, single item construct; 
 GFC 1 for years after 2007 (inclusive), 0 otherwise. 
   
INTSEC  Portfolio composition measure II, formative construct; 
 SECURITIES Investment security assets/total assets; 
 INTDERIV The notional amount of interest rate derivatives / total assets. 
   
S  On-balance sheet interest-rate sensitivity measure, single item construct; 
 SENSITIVE (Interest rate-sensitive assets - interest rate-sensitive liabilities)/total 
assets. 
   
SECINC  Earnings performance in securitizations measure, single item construct; 
 SECINC The net securitization income/net income. 
   
SECRISK  Composite asset securitization risk measure, reflective construct; 
 ABS Total outstanding securitized assets/total assets; 
 RETINT Total retained interests/ total asset; 
 CHGOFF_SEC Total charge-offs for securitized loans/ total asset; 
 NPL_SEC Total nonperforming securitized loans/total assets. 
   
SIZE  BHC size measure, single item construct; 
 LNTA The natural logarithm of total assets; 
   
TRANS  Portfolio composition measure III, single construct; 
 TRANSACCT Transaction accounts/ total deposit. 
 
